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We use the natural experiment provided by the opening and progressive extension of the Regional Ex- 
press Rail (RER) between 1970 and 20 0 0 in the Paris metropolitan region, and in particular the departure 
from the original plans due to budget constraints and technical considerations, to identify the causal im- 
pact of urban rail transport on ﬁrm location, employment and population growth. We apply a difference- 
in-differences method to a particular subsample, selected to minimize the endogeneity that is routinely 
found in the evaluation of the effects of transport infrastructure. We ﬁnd that the RER opening caused a 
8.8% rise in employment in the municipalities connected to the network between 1975 and 1990. While 
we ﬁnd no effect on overall population growth, our results suggest that the arrival of the RER may have 
increased competition for land, since high-skilled households were more likely to locate in the vicinity of 
a RER station. 
© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 
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0. Introduction 
In both Europe and North America, a number of ongoing
rojects have demonstrated policy-makers’ belief in the eﬃciency
f public spending on rail transport. We can mention here the
Crossrail”1 project in London, the “Grand Paris Express”2 in
rance, and the plan for high-speed rail in California. 3 Spending
n inland transport infrastructure is far from negligible, at 0.7%
f GDP in North America, 0.8% in Western Europe and 0.9% in
rance (OECD, 2011), underlining the importance of assessing the
eturn to those costly investments. Our paper supplies quantitative
vidence regarding the way in which urban rail transit can shape
rban development. To do so, we use the natural experiment This paper has beneﬁted from funding by the Société du Grand Paris. Numerous 
elpful comments were received in seminars at Crest, INSEE, the EEA Congress, the 
RSA Congress, the French Ministry for the Environment, the French Treasury, the 
EB workshop in urban economics and PSE-RUES. We would like to thank in partic- 
lar Leah Brooks, Benjamin Bureau, Gilles Duranton, Pauline Givord, Laurent Gobil- 
on, Miren Lafourcade, Claire Lelarge, Corinne Prost, Roland Rathelot, Rosa Sanchis- 
uarner, Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal and Nicolas Wagner for precious advice and 
iscussions, the IAU-IDF library and Danièle Bastide for data access. 
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1 http://www.crossrail.co.uk/ . 
2 http://www.societedugrandparis.fr/english-version . 
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094-1190/© 2017 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. ffered by the improvement of the Paris commuter rail system
rom the 1970s to the end of the 1990s. 
Between 1968 and 2006, the Parisian metropolitan area spread,
ith population rising from 9.2 million to 11.5 million (INSEE,
ensus). This growth was accompanied by the improvement of
he commuter rail system and the commissioning of the so-called
egional Express Rail (RER hereafter). While this policy mainly
mproved the existing network, it also entailed the construction
f new stations and lines. The improvement of the suburban rail
ystem into a fast high-capacity network offers an interesting
xperiment to estimate the causal impact of public mass transit
n the location of ﬁrms, employment and population across
etropolitan areas. We estimate the effect of a one-minute reduc-
ion in travel time by public transport on various indicators at the
unicipality level. 4 We take a difference-in-differences approach
sing a continuous treatment variable on a particular subsample
hat is selected to address potential endogeneity bias. We ﬁnd
hat local employment grows by 8.8% in municipalities that were
onnected to the RER network in the 1975–1990 period, with a
imilar order of magnitudes for ﬁrm location. However, we ﬁnd no
obust impact on population growth. 4 We will use the terms municipality and city interchangeably, referring to the 
dministrative units that are our units of observation (there are over 1300 munici- 
alities in the Paris region). 
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(  The existing evidence suggests that transport plays a key
role in the economics of cities. The standard monocentric city
model predicts that lower transport costs should increase the
share of the population living in the suburbs. In this model (see
Duranton and Puga, 2015 for a recent survey of both traditional
and modern versions of this model), lower transport costs also
increase city size by reducing congestion costs. There is empirical
support for this prediction. Baum-Snow (2007) considers the effect
of highways on the shape of US cities, and shows that roads
explain one third of the observed population movement from city
centers to the suburbs. Similar results have been found in Spain
( García-López et al., 2013 ). Duranton and Turner (2012) highlight
the positive impact of highways on city growth: a 10% rise in the
stock of highways causes 1.5% higher local employment in the US.
However, in line with theoretical models of economic geography
( Martin and Rogers, 1995 ), Faber (2014) conﬁrms that better
transport access may in some cases reduce economic activity. He
shows that highways reduced GDP growth in non-targeted pe-
ripheral counties in China. The empirical analysis of ﬁrm location
choice tends to ﬁnd a positive link with transport infrastructure.
Coughlin and Segev (20 0 0) show that highways foster foreign-
owned manufacturing plant location in US counties; Holl (2004a );
2004b ) ﬁnds similar results in Portugal and Spain. Strauss-Kahn
and Vives (2009) show that proximity to an airport is a signiﬁcant
predictor of headquarters relocation in the United States. More
generally, transport infrastructure is positively associated with city
productivity: Fernald (1999) shows that highway construction in
the US increased the productivity of vehicle-intensive industries
at the metropolitan level. Our contribution to this literature is to
consider how ﬁrm location, employment and overall population
react to investment in commuter rail, which is an important type
of transport infrastructure that has been only little-studied to date.
The existing evaluations of public transport have highlighted
that their effects on cities differ from those of other means of
transport. First, commuter-rail systems help to reduce air pollution
in cities. Chen and Whalley (2012) show that the opening of the
metro system in Taipei reduced the measured concentration of
carbon monoxide by 5 to 15% . Second, rail affects the location of
people and jobs in cities differently from other means of transport.
Using lights at night data for the 632 largest cities in the world,
Gonzalez-Navarro and Turner (2016) show that subway extensions
cause cities to spread, but with no impact on population growth.
In Baum-Snow and Kahn (20 0 0) , commuter-rail investment caused
a slight increase in the local value of properties in ﬁve major
American cities and encouraged switching from driving to public
transport. Burchﬁeld et al. (2006) also show that cities where pub-
lic transportation was embedded in the initial urban development
plan sprawl less than cities that were built for cars, due to the
higher commuting costs. Glaeser et al. (2008) emphasize an am-
biguous effect of public transportation on urban spatial inequality.
On the one hand, the mobility of the poor is higher in American
cities with good public transport, as car-based mobility is too
expensive; on the other hand, these cities are more segmented,
with lower-income residents being “stuck” close to rail stations
while the richer live in neighborhoods that are only accessible by
car. Our results are in line with the conclusions in Brueckner et al.
(1999) that European and American cities are different: for Paris,
we ﬁnd suggestive evidence of gentriﬁcation around train stations
in the inner ring of the Parisian suburbs. Last, considering the
effects in a major European city is a relevant question, as urban
mass transit plays a much larger role in commuting there than
in North America. For example, only 5.3% of American workers
use public transport to commute 5 ( McKenzie and Rapino, 2011 ),5 Not including those who work at home. 
chile 13.3% of French workers ( François, 2010 ) and 22.6% of
apanese commuters do so 6 (Japan Census, 2010). The use of cars
s prevalent in the US (90.0%), less prominent in France (72.3%)
nd even rarer in Japan (46.9%). 
In this paper, we investigate the impact of public transport on
rm-location choice in the suburbs of a large metropolitan area.
hen considering whether to locate in the city centre or suburbs,
rms face a trade-off ( Fujita and Ogawa, 1982 ). While land is
heaper in the suburbs, agglomeration spillovers will tend to be
ower, as other ﬁrms will be more distant. Commuting costs also
atter, as ﬁrms should compensate workers for longer commutes.
t can be argued that moving to the suburbs will reduce commut-
ng costs, as the population is less concentrated in city centers
han are ﬁrms. However, Duranton and Puga (2015) underline
wasteful” commuting patterns, in that workers do not necessarily
ommute to the closest workplace. This comes about due to pref-
rences for speciﬁc amenities, the location choice of two-earner
ouples or the costs of a move when changing job. 
Public transport will likely modify this trade-off, and we
resent evidence of this. First, the average commuting distance
f workers rises in RER municipalities, conﬁrming a fall in com-
uting costs allowing ﬁrms to locate further from the residences
f workers. Second, manufacturing ﬁrms do not locate more
requently in the vicinity of a RER station than other ﬁrms. This is
ot in line with the US results for highways in Duranton and Puga
2015) , and probably reﬂects that highway proximity reduces the
ransport costs of goods, while passenger rail does not. 
Transport infrastructure is not randomly located, producing
ndogeneity problems in the evaluation of its impact. A naive
valuation, comparing connected to unconnected areas, will cer-
ainly yield biased results, with the sign of the bias depending
ostly on policymakers’ objectives. The latter may be to connect
ither dynamic or deprived areas, depending on the public-policy
oal at the time of decision. The literature proposes a number
f identiﬁcation strategies to address this issue, based on nat-
ral experiments or clever instruments. Duranton and Turner
2012) evaluate the effect of the development of the highway net-
ork in the United States on the local evolution of employment.
hey use an instrumental-variable strategy, based on the 1947
lan of the Interstate highway system, partially reﬂecting military
bjectives and the late Nineteenth Century railroad network, to
ddress the endogeneity of current highway location. Michaels
2008) also uses the 1947 plan as an exogenous source of road
ariation to evaluate the impact on interstate trade. Donaldson
2017) shows that railway extensions in India reduced interregional
rade costs and increased both income and trade. To do so, he uses
he natural experiment provided by 40,0 0 0 km of planned lines
hat were never built for arguably exogenous reasons. Banerjee
t al. (2012) ﬁnd a moderate positive effect of transport access
n income growth in China. Their identiﬁcation strategy relies on
ailroad lines that were built in China to connect European conces-
ions on the coast to inland historical cities in the 19th Century.
hey argue that the areas crossed, which were located in between
hese two types of cities, were “quasi-randomly” linked to the
ailway network and can be compared to similar but unconnected
reas. Chandra and Thompson (20 0 0) is an early paper using the
ame identiﬁcation strategy for the impact of highways in the
nited States, looking at rural counties that were accidentally
reated because of their spatial location inbetween major cities. 
We provide two identiﬁcation strategies to address endo-
eneity. The ﬁrst is inspired by the approach in Banerjee et al.
2012) and Chandra and Thompson (20 0 0) . The RER network was6 This number refers to workers and students aged over 15; public transport in- 
ludes company or school buses; two answers can be given in the census - in this 
case respondents are split equally between the two modes. 
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Table 1 
The distribution of population and employment in the Paris region (Île-de-France) . 
Percentage distribution 
Paris Suburbs 
Total <15km 15–25 km <25km 
Area (sq. km) 12,012 1 5 10 84 
Population 1946 6,577,127 41 38 10 11 
1968 9,229,592 28 43 17 12 
1990 10,660,075 20 38 22 20 
2006 11,528,869 19 37 22 22 
Employment 1968 4,209,536 46 35 10 9 
1990 5,062,338 36 35 15 14 
2006 5,497,598 32 35 17 16 
Sources: Population Census 1968–2006. 
Table 2 
Commuting patterns across the Paris region (Île-de-France). 
Place of work 
Place of residence Paris Suburbs 
< 15 km 15–25 km > 25 km Total 
1968 Paris 87 11 1 1 100 
< 15 km 31 65 2 1 100 
15–25 km 27 19 51 3 100 
> 25 km 11 5 4 80 100 
2006 Paris 68 24 5 3 100 
< 15 km 29 60 8 3 100 
15–25 km 19 28 43 9 100 
> 25 km 12 14 16 58 100 
Notes: All ﬁgures are in %. For instance, in 2006, 29% of the workforce lived 
in the suburbs within 15km from Paris and commuted to Paris. Sources: 1968 
and 2006 Population Censuses. 
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7 Referring to the administrative region called the Île-de-France. 
8 During a helicopter tour over the metropolitan area, President De Gaulle ap- 
parently ordered Paul Delouvrier, General delegate for the Paris region, to “Put this 
mess in order!”
9 Schéma directeur d’aménagement et d’urbanisme de la Région Parisienne. 
10 New Towns designate areas located between 15 and 35 km away from the cen- 
ter of Paris in relatively underdeveloped areas at the time that were planned for 
development. They were supposed to house between 50 0 0 0 0 and 1,0 0 0,0 0 0 inhab- 
itants and thus contribute to a more even distribution of the population over the 
Paris region, in order to reduce urban congestion. Each of those New Towns includes 
a number of municipalities. eveloped with the aim of connecting new economic subcenters
o the historical center of the city. These economic subcenters
re located between 15 and 30 km away from central Paris. By
oing so, the RER lines cross areas which are located between the
istorical core and these subcenters. Such stations were “quasi-
andomly” included in the RER enhancement program, as there
as no “intention to treat” by policy makers. They can therefore
e compared to similar untreated areas to estimate the causal
mpact of railway improvement. 
Our second strategy, presented as a robustness test, is inspired
with some important differences explained in the relevant sec-
ion) by the method used in Donaldson (2017) , Duranton and
urner (2012) and Michaels (2008) . An urban plan was presented
n 1965 to improve the Paris suburban train system, which en-
isioned the construction of hundreds of kilometers of new lines
n the outskirts. The actual RER network differs from this initial
roposition, as its actual development mainly consisted in up-
rading some of the existing suburban rail lines. This modiﬁcation
f the initial plan occurred after a political change and mainly
eﬂected budgetary considerations. This incidental divergence from
he initial project suggests an exogenous selection process for
arts of the RER network. We can thus use this as an alternative
ay of identifying the causal impact of the treatment. 
Last, data availability and precision is key issue for the es-
imation of the impact of improved transport systems. Gibbons
t al. (2012) insist that, when networks are already dense, it does
ot suﬃce to observe the binary outcome of being connected
or not) to the transportation system: rather a measure of the
mprovement in rail service quality is required to assess how
etter public-transport access affects the behavior of economic
gents. We therefore do not use connection to the RER networks our treatment: we instead develop a method to calculate the
verage journey time by train across the Paris metropolitan region,
rom 1969 to 2009. Of all the lines in the RER network, some had
rastically-reduced travel time, thanks to substantial investment,
hile this ﬁgure barely improved for others. We use this variation
o estimate the effect of the development of the RER. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
ection 2 describes the recent history of urban planning in
he Paris region and how this relates to the RER development. Our
stimation strategy is set out in Section 3 . The following section
rovides the econometric speciﬁcation, while Section 5 presents
he data used. The sixth section describes the results, and ﬁnally
ection 7 concludes and discusses our ﬁndings. 
. The development of the Paris region 
A massive development of the Paris region 7 occurred during
he second half of the 20th century. While the population rose
rom 6.6 million in 1946 to 9.2 million in 1968 and 10.5 million
n 2006, jobs and population dramatically decentralized from the
ity center to the outskirts of the city (see Table 1 ). The share of
he population living in the city of Paris, corresponding to the
istorical center of the metropolitan area, fell from 41% in 1946 to
8% in 1968 and 19% in 2006. Job location followed the same trend
ut remained more centralized. Table 2 shows that the proportion
f workers commuting to the city center dropped both for people
iving in the city of Paris and those living in the outskirts of the
etropolitan areas (except for those living over 25 km away from
aris). The diagonal elements in this table, describing individuals
orking and living in the same part of the Paris region, are all
ower in 2006 than in 1968: mobility across the Paris region has
argely improved over that period. 
While the development and organization of the suburbs was
ostly left uncontrolled until the 1960s, the coming to power
f President De Gaulle can be seen as a turning point ( Section A
n the Appendix provides more details on the previous period).
e Gaulle’s government decided to implement a new planning
olicy to organize the scattered and under-equipped suburbs 8 and
upport the economic and demographic development of the Paris
egion. The SDAURP 9 urban plan, presented in 1965, embodied this
hange in policy. This plan included the redeﬁnition of adminis-
rative boundaries, the construction of new infrastructure and the
ecentralization of jobs and people to “New Towns”. The SDAURP
lan envisioned an ambitious commuter rail system, the so-called
egional Express Rail. The RER was supposed to upgrade the sub-
rban train network by the construction of hundreds of kilometers
f new lines crossing the historical core of Paris towards the new
ubcenters of the Paris metropolitan area, namely the ﬁve New
owns 10 ( Marne-la-Vallée, Cergy-Pontoise, Saint-Quentin-en-Yvelines, 
elun-Sénart and Évry ), the two airports ( Orly and Roissy ) and the
a Défense business district. Fig. 1 plots these different areas. 
This ambitious project was implemented over the two follow-
ng decades in a more modest way than initially planned. In the
nd, the RER project mainly consisted of the upgrading of existing
ines by connecting them together with tunnels passing under the
4 T. Mayer, C. Trevien / Journal of Urban Economics 102 (2017) 1–21 
Fig. 1. The RER and the new subcenters. 
Source: IAU – Île-de-France. New Towns are areas that were chosen in the 1965 urban plan to become new subcenters. The borders inside those areas show the munici- 
palities. The Subway Area highlights all municipalities that have at least one Parisian metro station. The borders again represent municipalities, where in this case all 20 
arrondissements inside Paris are treated as separate municipalities. 
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(  historical city center of Paris. It also included the construction
of new branch lines in the outskirts, the commissioning of new
trains and high-frequency services. In the end, only 71 of the 433
RER stations were fully new; 98 km of new railways were built
and 22 km were reopened out of a 600-km network. the 600-km
ﬁnal RER network. 
However, the ﬁve-line network that opened progressively be-
tween 1969 and 2004 did achieve the goals set out in the 1965
plan to connect the new subcenters to the historical center of
Paris (see Fig. 1 ). Despite only few new track segments, the RER
led to signiﬁcant improvements in the commuter-rail network and
made commuting much easier (see Fig. 4 in the Appendix for an
example). According to our simulations, the mean travel time to
Paris 11 was 49.9 min in 1969. Between 1969 and 2009 this fell by
5.8 min for the municipalities connected to the RER but by only
1.3 min for those outside the new network. The RER thus provided
a drop of about 10% in commuting time for the connected mu-
nicipalities. This improvement may seem small in size, but the
average gain is still about four times larger in treated relative to
control cities. Furthermore this average ﬁgure hides a wide variety
of changes that will be the source of our identiﬁcation. 
3. Identiﬁcation strategy 
As new lines and new stations were actually rare, our empirical
strategy focuses on existing stations. We construct a control group
of suburban train stations that were not connected to the RER
in 1990. We compare these to stations that already existed in
1960 and were upgraded to RER stations by 1990. This section de-11 Travel time to Paris is the mean of the minimum travel times to the 20 bor- 
oughs (“arrondissements”) of Paris. In this ﬁgure we only consider the municipal- 
ities between 5 and 35 km from Paris, which are the most likely to beneﬁt from 
the RER, excluding the subway area shown in Fig. 1 . 
a  
a  
i  
W  
(  
(cribes which stations we choose to obtain a plausibly exogenous
reatment. Our spatial unit of analysis is the municipality . This is
mposed by our need for long-run data that are only available at
his level, and means that we do not analyze the exact vicinity of
n RER station but rather municipalities (administrative units that
an be understood as cities) that include mass-transit stations (see
ection 5 for more details on French municipalities). 
.1. Comparison of intermediate cities 
Our main identiﬁcation strategy focuses on intermediate cities.
s noted above, the RER network was developed with the aim of
onnecting the historical center of Paris to new subcenters. Con-
equently, RER lines happen to cross the municipalities located in
etween. We argue that these municipalities ended up being con-
ected to the RER network unintentionally, in a similar approach
o that in Banerjee et al. (2012) . In addition, the RER project mainly
onsisted of the enhancement of the existing commuter-train net-
ork. As such, most of the intermediate stations were built in the
9th Century, leaving little possibility for RER route manipulation. 
In our regressions, we only consider municipalities with at least
ne commuter-rail station in 1975. We ﬁrst exclude termini areas
rom both the control and treatment groups, as these were ex-
licitly targeted by the RER policy. By termini areas, we mean the
istoric city of Paris and the municipalities that are part of a New
own, host an airport or are in the business district of La Défense
see Fig. 1 ). Treatment is clearly not exogenous in these cases. In
ddition, as all New Towns and airports, the historic city center
nd the business district were connected to the RER network, it
s impossible to ﬁnd good counterfactuals for these municipalities.
e also exclude municipalities connected to the subway network
the Parisian métro) as we cannot use our identiﬁcation strategy
based on intermediate municipalities) for these. 
T. Mayer, C. Trevien / Journal of Urban Economics 102 (2017) 1–21 5 
Fig. 2. Control and treatment groups. 
Source: IAU – Île-de-France. 
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3
 Among the municipalities selected in our subsample, some
ere connected to the RER network because they happened to be
ocated on the route between the historical city center and the
ew economic centers. We logically use these as the treatment
roup, excluding municipalities which were treated for other rea-
ons. 12 Other municipalities, which are still served by commuter
rains but not by the RER, are used as the control group. Finally,
e only include municipalities within 25 km from Paris in our
ample, as the outer-ring municipalities were often rural in the
960s and accounted for only 11% of the Paris region population
nd 9% of jobs in 1968 (see Table 1 ). In addition, these municipali-
ies are too far from Paris to be located on the itinerary to the new
conomic subcenters (see Fig. 2 ). Table 11 (in the Appendix) shows
hat there is no signiﬁcant difference in the employment growth of
he control and treatment groups before the RER implementation,
uggesting treatment exogeneity in this subsample. 12 Collardey (1999) lists many technical reasons which explain the selection of 
ER lines amongst suburban rail lines. First, some lines were totally out of date 
nd needed major improvement. For example, the Vincennes line, which serves the 
outh East part of the region, still used steam trains in 1969. Second, three stations 
n Paris required an underground extension in order to relieve traﬃc congestion, 
nd were logically connected to the RER. At Austerlitz station, suburban trains in- 
erfered with main-line traﬃc when crossing the station; St-Lazare station was the 
rst station in terms of suburban traﬃc; free surface railway tracks were needed 
t the Gare de Lyon for high-speed rail. Third, Gerondeau (2003) describes the dif- 
cult relationships between the two public companies in charge of Paris suburban 
rain network: the RATP (the subway company) and the SNCF (the national railway 
ompany). The RATP envisioned the RER project as a regional subway which would 
e independent of the SNCF suburban network. The ﬁrst two lines and the SDAURP 
lan of 1965 were planned along these lines, and required the SNCF to sell local 
ines, without any main-line traﬃc, or to build brand new lines. This was no longer 
he case starting from the 1980s. 
t  
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w  We argue that the location of the new economic centers in the
aris metropolitan region is exogenous. The initial 1965 project
entioned the construction of eight New Towns, while only ﬁve
ere actually built. Moreover, the experts associated with this
rocess ( Alduy, 1983 ) insisted on the fact that they were mostly
ocated in rural areas and not in those that were already devel-
ped. In addition, Orly airport was established on a WWI military
ase and Roissy airport on a large plot of agricultural land. It is
hus very unlikely that the location of these subcenters (airports
nd New Towns) was determined to facilitate the connection of
ntermediate cities to the RER. 
.2. Differences between plans and outcomes 
Our alternative identiﬁcation strategy, used as a robustness
est, relies on the difference between the initial RER project and
he actual resulting network. Even though tunneling work for the
ast-West line started in 1961 (see Section A in the Appendix
or more details), the RER project was actually launched in 1965
ith the SDAURP plan. As stated above, this very ambitious plan
as greatly modiﬁed during the development of the current RER
etwork. When possible, existing lines were improved instead of
uilding new sections of rail tracks. We use this substantial gap
etween the 1965 SDAURP plan and the ﬁnal network to construct
n alternative identiﬁcation strategy. The treatment group here
onsists of municipalities that were not supposed to be treated
ccording to the initial 1965 plan, but ended up being connected
o the RER network (see Fig. 3 in the Appendix). The control group
emains the same as in the main identiﬁcation strategy. 
Note that our use of the RER plan is very different from existing
ork using initial infrastructure plans as an instrument for the
6 T. Mayer, C. Trevien / Journal of Urban Economics 102 (2017) 1–21 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Comparison of the control and treatment groups for the ﬁrst identiﬁca- 
tion strategy – Mean values and standard deviations. 
Untreated Treated 
Pop. density in 1975 (people per sq. km) 3420 
(3266) 
5800 
(2909) 
Empl. density in 1975 (workers per sq. km) 989 
(1317) 
1759 
(1510) 
Firm density in 1975 (ﬁrms per sq. km) 109 
(140) 
167 
(105) 
Travel time to Paris in 1975 (min) 47 
(8) 
41 
(7) 
 travel time to Paris 1975–1990 (min) 1 . 4 
(1) 
2 . 8 
(1 . 5) 
Distance to Paris (km) 16 . 5 
(4 . 6) 
13 . 6 
(4 . 4) 
Surface (sq. km) 6 
(3 . 3) 
6 . 6 
(4 . 9) 
Job growth rate 1968–75 (in pct) 24 
(48) 
12 
(29) 
Job growth rate 1975–90 (in pct) 32 
(62) 
22 
(38) 
Number of cities 64 32 
Notes: Treatment status in 1990, a treated city includes a RER station. 
Standard deviations are in parentheses. 
Sources: Population Census, SIRENE. 
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t  current network ( Michaels, 2008; Duranton and Turner, 2012; Du-
ranton et al., 2014 , for example). The main argument in this exist-
ing work is that the initial plan was designed according to criteria
(mostly exploration routes or historical military objectives) that
are exogenous to modern economic outcomes. The RER case is dif-
ferent, as the main aim of the project was to connect the new eco-
nomic subcenters to the city center and exactly targeted the eco-
nomic perspectives of the connected areas. Unlike in this research,
the exogeneity of our identiﬁcation strategy rather comes from the
difference between the planned and the ﬁnal networks, due to bud-
getary constraints, which forced policy-makers to upgrade existing
lines that had not been selected in the ﬁrst round of the project. 
This modiﬁcation of the RER project was largely due to non-
economic factors, and independent of the growth perspectives of
the treated municipalities. Zembri (2006) shows that the election
of President Pompidou, following the resignation of President de
Gaulle in 1969, played a major role in the way in which the RER
project developed. The cost of the projected new lines was the
main reason for the deviation from the original project, and the
new administration considered that it was possible to achieve
similar goals by mostly using the existing network. As stated
above, this turned out to be true. Such sudden changes in the RER
program also suggest that long-term economic anticipations were
not pivotal in the choice of RER routes, except for the new subcen-
ters. Moreover, there is little chance that development perspectives
would change that quickly when considering the construction of
a transport infrastructure designed to last over a century. We ﬁnd
similar results for employment with both identiﬁcation strategies
(see Table 14 in the Appendix). 
4. Econometric method 
This section sets out how we measure the effect of the RER
on ﬁrm location, employment and population, applying the two
identiﬁcation strategies discussed above. We work at the munic-
ipality level and our main treatment variable is the variation in
travel time by public transport from our stations of interest to the
city center (deﬁned as the City of Paris). This variable picks up the
heterogeneity in the RER treatment across municipalities. We also
run robustness checks using a (simpler) dummy variable taking
the value of one if a RER station is located in the municipality. 
The period covered by our estimation stretches from 1975 to
1990. As the RER network spread progressively over the Paris
metropolitan region, the treatment group grows over time while
the control group becomes smaller (see Fig. 2 ). Consequently, there
are too few untreated municipalities in the inner ring after 1990
and it is diﬃcult to use our identiﬁcation strategy after that date.
In addition, the major network improvements were put into place
in the 1970s and 1980s; the impact of the RER hence fades out in
the subsequent period, even if we ﬁnd signiﬁcant but smaller RER
effects between 1990 and 2006 (see Table 12 in the Appendix). We
thus use the following baseline regression: 
 ln Y i, 75 −90 = αtime i Paris , 75 −90 + βX i, 1975 + i , (1)
where the dependent variable is the growth rate in population,
employment or the number of ﬁrms ( Y ) in municipality i between
1975 and 1990,  ln Y i, 75 −90 = ln Y i, 1990 − ln Y i, 1975 . We regress this
variable on the treatment, which is the fall in the travel time to
central Paris between 1975 and 1990. 13 We also add initial socio-
demographic and geographic controls X i , 1975 : the initial density
of the variable considered, land availability (i.e. the share of farm13 Note that we express time as a fall, so that it represents an improvement in 
city-center access and we expect α > 0. Alternative time spells and variables are 
used as robustness tests: see Section 6.5 . 
1
w
uand in 1960), the distance to Paris, area, geographic dummies
North, South, East or West of Paris), the initial travel time by pub-
ic transport and measures of alternative transport infrastructure
highways, and commuter train in some speciﬁcations). 
Table 3 shows the 1975 differences between the control and
reatment groups, where the treatment is considered as the pres-
nce of an RER station: municipalities with at least one RER station
an be seen to be denser and closer to Paris at this date. Note
lso that the growth rate of employment is higher in untreated
elative to treated municipalities. This is because the control mu-
icipalities are smaller and grew more rapidly via catch-up. These
ifferences in observables lead us to suspect that the two groups
n Table 3 differ also in unobservables. We therefore do not use
he presence of an RER station as the treatment in our analysis. 
In Table 4 , we relate our preferred treatment variable, the fall
n travel time, to city characteristics. Column (1) shows a clear link
etween travel-time reduction and having an RER station, as ex-
ected. Travel time fell by 2.8 min between 1975 and 1990 in RER
unicipalities, while it only dropped by 1.4 min in municipalities
utside of the RER network. Columns (2) to (4) show that very few
ariables are signiﬁcantly correlated with this travel-time change.
n the contrary, as stated in column (4), there is a clearer link
etween RER station location and city demographic characteristics,
specially previous population growth, conﬁrming the message
rom the descriptive statistics in Table 3 . This ﬁnding is a further
rgument in favor of using travel-time reduction as our treatment
ariable (as well as measuring the treatment more accurately).
n addition, we add the straight line distance between Paris and
he closest economic subcenter as a control variable. When this
istance is small, the municipality is likely to be an intermediate
top between Paris and a subcenter. We ﬁnd that treatment is
ore intense in these intermediate places, but this relation is
igniﬁcant only for travel-time variation. 
Finally, we provide an additional robustness test based on
he weighted propensity-score method ( Imbens and Wooldridge,
009 ) to ensure that our estimation of the treatment effect is not
iased by non-linearities. 14 We slightly adapt the initial setting for
his robustness test, given that the continuous treatment variable14 We weight treated municipalities, i.e. municipalities with an RER station in 
990, by 1/ e and control municipalities by 1 / (1 − e ) in our baseline regression, 
here e is the propensity score estimated with the regression presented in col- 
mn (5) of Table 4 . 
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Table 4 
The determinants of travel-time reduction and selection for the RER treatment. 
Dependent variable: time Paris, 1975 −1990 RER station 
Model: OLS Logistic 
Subsample: 1st ident. 2nd ident. 
method method 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Intercept 1 . 43 ∗∗∗
(0 . 126) 
2 . 984 ∗
(1 . 718) 
0 . 501 
(1 . 758) 
−0 . 184 
(1 . 42) 
2 . 813 
(2 . 718) 
RER 1990 (dummy var.) 1 . 282 
∗∗∗
(0 . 19) 
Distance to straight line from Paris to a subcenter −0 . 161 ∗∗∗
(0 . 051) 
−0 . 059 
(0 . 118) 
Pop density 1975 < 10 0 0 −2 . 079 ∗
(1 . 087) 
−2 . 058 
(1 . 349) 
−0 . 424 
(0 . 687) 
−4 . 827 ∗∗∗
(1 . 749) 
Pop density 1975 [10 0 0, 250 0] −1 . 688 ∗
(1 . 006) 
−2 . 196 ∗
(1 . 308) 
−0 . 544 
(0 . 645) 
−3 . 159 ∗∗
(1 . 539) 
Pop density 1975 [2500, 5000] −1 . 4 4 4 
(0 . 983) 
−1 . 611 
(1 . 27) 
−0 . 047 
(0 . 605) 
−1 . 327 
(1 . 304) 
Pop density 1975 [50 0 0, 10 0 0 0] −0 . 795 
(0 . 912) 
−0 . 648 
(1 . 132) 
0 . 22 
(0 . 545) 
0 . 177 
(1 . 092) 
Pop density 1975 > 10 0 0 0 ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Pop growth 1946 −75 −0 . 003 
(0 . 039) 
0 . 007 
(0 . 041) 
−0 . 023 
(0 . 042) 
−0 . 188 ∗
(0 . 112) 
Time Paris1975 0 . 068 
∗∗
(0 . 029) 
0 . 052 
(0 . 034) 
0 . 041 
(0 . 029) 
< 1km highway (1990) 0 . 261 
(0 . 336) 
0 . 427 
(0 . 422) 
0 . 377 
(0 . 411) 
1 . 143 
(0 . 752) 
5 km ≤ d Paris < 10 km −2 . 383 ∗∗
(0 . 943) 
−0 . 399 
(0 . 764) 
−0 . 194 
(0 . 651) 
−3 . 787 ∗
(2 . 119) 
10 km ≤ d Paris < 15 km −1 . 012 ∗
(0 . 541) 
0 . 409 
(0 . 497) 
−0 . 116 
(0 . 405) 
−1 . 938 
(1 . 546) 
15 km ≤d Paris < 20 km −0 . 501 ∗
(0 . 299) 
0 . 508 ∗
(0 . 275) 
−0 . 096 
(0 . 276) 
−1 . 248 
(1 . 048) 
20 km ≤d Paris < 25 km ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Share of farmland 1960 −0 . 455 
(0 . 532) 
−0 . 425 
(0 . 543) 
−0 . 441 
(0 . 598) 
1 . 874 
(1 . 428) 
West 0 . 237 
(0 . 292) 
0 . 031 
(0 . 375) 
0 . 281 
(0 . 277) 
−0 . 237 
(0 . 627) 
North ref. ref. ref. ref. 
East 0 . 604 
(0 . 456) 
−0 . 019 
(0 . 628) 
0 . 361 
(0 . 513) 
−0 . 926 
(0 . 829) 
South 0 . 802 ∗∗∗
(0 . 293) 
0 . 272 
(0 . 416) 
0 . 881 ∗∗∗
(0 . 298) 
0 . 848 
(0 . 65) 
Area 0 . 033 ∗
(0 . 017) 
0 . 017 
(0 . 037) 
0 . 02 
(0 . 031) 
0 . 132 ∗∗
(0 . 058) 
Number of observations 143 128 96 98 128 
R 2 0.243 0.281 0.258 0.262 
AIC 166 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are run on cities that had a 
train station in 1975, excluding economic subcenters, and located between 5 and 25 km from Paris. time Paris, 1975 −1990 is 
the travel-time reduction in the municipality considered to the center of Paris between 1975 and 1990. 
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d  s inadequate for the calculation of a propensity score. We instead
se the presence of a station in the municipality. The results
resented in Table 13 (in the Appendix) are very similar to the
aseline results. This conﬁrms that our model controls for the
re-existing differences between the control and treatment groups.
. Data 
We use data at the municipality level from different sources for
nformation on the number of ﬁrms, employment and population.
e also construct a new dataset to describe the evolution of the
rban transport system between the 1970s and the 20 0 0s. 
In this paper we use data at the municipality level. The mu-
icipality (or “commune”) is the smallest administrative division
n France and also the most precise Census unit for historical
ata. Municipality boundaries are very stable over time, having
arely changed since the French Revolution. Census data are thus
asily comparable over long periods of time. French municipalities
re particularly small in comparison to other European countries
there are 1300 in the Paris region), which provides us with a quite
mall geographical scale for this type of estimation. In addition,
or the municipality of Paris, which is by far the most populated
unicipality in the region, disaggregated data are available for the0 “arrondissements”. In the end, we have 96 municipalities in
ur main regression sample (see Fig. 3 ). 
Most of the data used in our analysis comes from the Census.
he French Census provides a large set of variables at the munic-
pality level that are directly comparable over time. This dataset
ncludes information on population, employment broken down
nto four industries (Agriculture, Manufacturing, Construction and
ervices), commuting patterns and social composition in terms
f diploma for each census year (1968, 1975, 1982, 1990, 1999
nd 2006). The data on ﬁrms come from the French administra-
ive business register “SIRENE” between 1974 and 2004. SIRENE
rovides information on the industry and location of each ﬁrm,
long with its opening and closing years. We calculate the number
f ﬁrms at the municipality level in each census year. We also
se information on foreign investment over the period under
onsideration. Up to the 1990s, foreign investors had to register
very investment in France at the French Treasury. We create a
ataset of foreign direct investment (FDI) using this administrative
equirement. As this compulsory registration was phased out in
he 1990s, reliable data on FDI are available only up to 1994. 
To calculate travel-time reduction, we assume that the RER
id not increase the speed of trains, but rather improved public
8 T. Mayer, C. Trevien / Journal of Urban Economics 102 (2017) 1–21 
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15 The treatment group includes 32 municipalities. Average employment was 
10600 in 1975 in the 73 municipalities that are connected to the RER network 
within 25 km of Paris. We exclude the most central part of the Paris region con- 
nected to the subway network in these ﬁgures. transport thanks to fewer train changes (see Fig. 4 for an exam-
ple). This assumption is supported by the fact that most of the
electriﬁcation of the commuter train network, which increased
train speed by phasing out steam traction, was completed several
years before the RER. The observed change in travel time therefore
reﬂects the connection of previously separate lines. 
Our treatment variable is constructed as follows. We start by
creating a database of the whole Parisian railway transportation
system. For each metro, train and RER line, we know i) the travel
time between all stations on the line, ii) the connection time be-
tween different lines at a given station, and iii) the opening years
of stations and rail-line segments. We apply a simple shortest-path
algorithm to calculate the journey time between every pair of sta-
tions in the Paris transport system for all years between 1969 and
2009. The algorithm is applied to the network in place the year
under consideration, using the set of existing lines and stations
to calculate the fastest trip between two stations. Comparing the
results from the past and current networks yields the change
in travel time between every pair of stations over our period
of interest (1975 to 1990). We last calculate for each suburban
municipality the mean reduction in travel time to the 20 admin-
istrative districts (“arrondissements”) of Paris, in order to obtain
a simple measure of the improvement associated with the RER
that is both relevant and can be compared across municipalities.
This variable, expressed in minutes and hereafter referred to as
time Paris,75-90 , is a natural summary statistic for the transport
system, as the network is very centralized around Paris. 
This treatment variable may not fully account for the improve-
ment due to the RER, such as higher frequency, new trains, and
improved reliability. To test the robustness of our approach, we use
an alternative variable, namely the presence of a RER station in the
municipality and the number of RER stations in the municipality. A
natural measure of the improved quality of the network would be
the increased frequency of trains, which played a large role in the
improvement of the Paris commuter-train system. Unfortunately,
these data are not available over our period of reference. 
Note also that all treatment variables are aggregated at the
municipality level, while they only affect economic agents located
in the vicinity of a station. Consequently, we do not know exactly
who beneﬁted from such improvements. Any given municipality
will included both treated (in the catchment area of a RER station)
and untreated (elsewhere) individuals. In other words, more RER
stations or greater falls in travel time do not necessarily imply the
same transport improvement for everyone in the municipality. 
One important control variable is the proximity to the highway
network. Highways are not uniformly distributed across the Paris
metropolitan region, and this accessibility improved in some
municipalities but not others. We create a dummy variable for the
nearest highway being under 1km away. 
6. Results 
6.1. The effect of the RER on employment 
Table 5 provides our benchmark results for employment growth,
with the ﬁrst column showing the results from the simplest speci-
ﬁcation. All municipalities connected to the suburban rail network
are included, except for the most central part of the Paris region,
which is very urbanized with a dense subway system. We also
control for some basic municipality characteristics. One dominant
feature of municipal growth in Paris region seems to be catching-
up, since the effect of initial job density declines steadily with
this density. We also note that the Parisian economic suburbs
grew very quickly between 1975 and 1990. The estimated effect of
travel-time reduction is positive and signiﬁcant at 5.7%. Excludingconomic subcenters in column (2) barely changes the coeﬃcient
n the treatment to around 5.6%. 
The results from our preferred identiﬁcation strategy appear in
olumns (3) and (4). The treatment group here includes only inter-
ediate cities, located between Paris and the economic subcenters.
n the regression results in column (3), we include a broad set of
ontrols that likely affect job location, whereas we only retain the
tatistically-signiﬁcant estimates in column (4). Note that, within
his subsample, there is no impact of highways on employment
rowth. Table 17 in the Appendix provides an extensive investi-
ation of the respective highway and RER effects. The highway
ffects remain insigniﬁcant when splitting the highway variable
nto municipalities connected to the highway network before and
fter 1975, or removing the RER variable. Table 17 shows that high-
ays have a positive and signiﬁcant effect only for Manufacturing
mployment, while the RER impact is positive and signiﬁcant
or all industries (expect Agriculture). Overall those results are
eassuring, in that our treatment variable does not seem to be
icking up the effect of changes in other types of transport. 
Last, our preferred regression appears in column (4). We ﬁnd
hat employment growth was 6.1% higher with a one minute fall in
ravel time to Paris over the period. Note that the distances to the
losest airport and closest New Town are insigniﬁcant in column
3), and do not much change the size of the treatment effect when
emoved in column (4). The faster employment growth in RER
ntermediate municipalities is then not due to potential spillover
ffects from their proximity to economic subcenters. The effect
f lower travel times is economically large, and might capture
ther RER-related improvements: new trains, more frequent ser-
ices or renovated stations. We argue that this variable, although
mperfect, better measures transport improvement following the
ER opening than a simple dummy variable for the municipality
eing connected to the RER network. As evidence, we interact the
ER dummy with our baseline treatment variable (see Table 10 in
he Appendix): employment is shown to rise only if lower travel
imes are associated with a new RER station. This conﬁrms that
ur treatment variable captures the multiple dimensions of RER
mprovement. 
For ease of interpretation, the results in column (5) refer to
normalized” travel time, to show the average treatment effect in
ur regression. Given that travel time fell by an average of 2.8 min
n the treatment group, compared to 1.4 min in the control group,
e calculate the normalized treatment as 
˜ time Paris , 1975 −1990 ≡
(time Paris , 1975 −1990 − 1 . 4) 
(2 . 8 − 1 . 4) . (2)
n other words, the mean value of ˜ time Paris , 1975 −1990 is zero for
nconnected municipalities and one for connected municipalities.
his re-scaled variable is useful in that it directly shows the aver-
ge effect of RER treatment in treated municipalities. The remainder
f our results use this new measure, when possible. From the
oint estimate in our column (5) baseline regression, the RER thus
aused a 8.8% rise in employment in connected municipalities. 
Finally, we can try to produce a (rough) estimate of the number
f jobs that the RER added in treated municipalities. Considering
hat 9,500 employees worked in the average treated municipality
n 1975, the RER produced a rise in employment of around 840
etween 1975 and 1990. This corresponds to a total rise of 270 0 0
obs in the treatment group, and 680 0 0 jobs if we consider that
ur treatment estimation is valid for all of the peripheral munic-
palities connected to the RER. 15 Note that this calculation does
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Table 5 
The effect of the RER on employment. 
Dependent variable: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Sample ln employment 1975 −90 
- Municipalities with a train station in 1975      
- No economic subcenters     
- Treatment group = intermediate municipalities (1st identiﬁcation strategy)    
Intercept −0 . 194 
(0 . 381) 
−0 . 155 
(0 . 384) 
0 . 031 
(0 . 59) 
−0 . 278 
(0 . 26) 
−0 . 195 
(0 . 261) 
time Paris, 1975 −1990 0 . 057 ∗∗∗
(0 . 017) 
0 . 056 ∗∗∗
(0 . 017) 
0 . 066 ∗∗∗
(0 . 02) 
0 . 061 ∗∗∗
(0 . 02) 
˜ time Paris, 1975 −1990 0 . 088 ∗∗∗
(0 . 028) 
Time Paris , 1975 −0 . 005 
(0 . 005) 
−0 . 003 
(0 . 005) 
−0 . 006 
(0 . 006) 
−0 . 005 
(0 . 005) 
−0 . 005 
(0 . 005) 
Job density 1975 < 200 0 . 819 
∗∗∗
(0 . 133) 
0 . 72 ∗∗∗
(0 . 135) 
0 . 657 ∗∗∗
(0 . 181) 
0 . 639 ∗∗∗
(0 . 151) 
0 . 639 ∗∗∗
(0 . 151) 
Job density 1975 [200, 500] 0 . 643 
∗∗∗
(0 . 118) 
0 . 588 ∗∗∗
(0 . 115) 
0 . 488 ∗∗∗
(0 . 173) 
0 . 502 ∗∗∗
(0 . 127) 
0 . 502 ∗∗∗
(0 . 127) 
Job density 1975 [500, 1000] 0 . 318 
∗∗∗
(0 . 094) 
0 . 339 ∗∗∗
(0 . 092) 
0 . 308 ∗
(0 . 163) 
0 . 307 ∗∗∗
(0 . 105) 
0 . 307 ∗∗∗
(0 . 105) 
Job density 1975 [10 0 0, 250 0] 0 . 217 
∗∗∗
(0 . 081) 
0 . 206 ∗∗∗
(0 . 077) 
0 . 172 
(0 . 143) 
0 . 191 ∗∗
(0 . 085) 
0 . 191 ∗∗
(0 . 085) 
Job density 1975 > 2500 ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
< 1km highway (1990) 0 . 082 
(0 . 081) 
0 . 076 
(0 . 079) 
0 . 082 
(0 . 1) 
5 km ≤d Paris < 10 km 0 . 355 ∗∗∗
(0 . 135) 
0 . 353 ∗∗∗
(0 . 128) 
0 . 09 
(0 . 175) 
0 . 184 
(0 . 118) 
0 . 184 
(0 . 118) 
10 km ≤d Paris < 15 km 0 . 172 ∗
(0 . 094) 
0 . 167 ∗
(0 . 095) 
0 . 008 
(0 . 128) 
0 . 101 
(0 . 102) 
0 . 101 
(0 . 102) 
15 km ≤d Paris < 20 km 0 . 114 
(0 . 083) 
0 . 135 
(0 . 082) 
0 . 025 
(0 . 107) 
0 . 054 
(0 . 105) 
0 . 054 
(0 . 105) 
20 km ≤ d Paris < 25 km ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Share of farmland 1960 0 . 245 
∗∗
(0 . 123) 
0 . 231 ∗
(0 . 121) 
0 . 207 
(0 . 145) 
0 . 258 
(0 . 158) 
0 . 258 
(0 . 158) 
Area −0 . 002 
(0 . 005) 
0 . 002 
(0 . 005) 
0 . 008 
(0 . 007) 
0 . 012 
(0 . 007) 
0 . 012 
(0 . 007) 
West 0 . 055 
(0 . 083) 
−0 . 014 
(0 . 071) 
0 . 036 
(0 . 084) 
North ref. ref. ref. 
East 0 . 062 
(0 . 124) 
−0 . 023 
(0 . 109) 
0 . 022 
(0 . 132) 
South −0 . 021 
(0 . 131) 
−0 . 093 
(0 . 125) 
−0 . 111 
(0 . 166) 
Dist. to new town −0 . 007 
(0 . 01) 
−0 . 008 
(0 . 01) 
−0 . 0 0 05 
(0 . 0156) 
Dist. to airport −0 . 004 
(0 . 007) 
−0 . 007 
(0 . 007) 
−0 . 009 
(0 . 011) 
New town 0 . 707 ∗∗
(0 . 302) 
Airport 0 . 04 
(0 . 112) 
La Défense 0 . 491 ∗∗∗
(0 . 13) 
Number of observations 143 128 96 96 96 
Notes: All estimations are OLS. Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are run on cities 
that had a train station in 1975 and were located between 5 and 25 km from Paris. The treatment variable ˜ time Paris , 1975 −1990 is deﬁned 
in equation (2) , page 8. Column (1) includes all municipalities that had a suburban train station in 1975, Column (2) removes the economic 
subcenters, Columns (3) to (5) reduce the set of treated municipalities to intermediate cities (between subcenters and Paris, as described in 
Section 3 ). Sources: Population Census. 
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sot distinguish between growth and reorganization effects: some
f those new jobs may have been relocated from the non-treated
arts of the Paris region. We will come back to this point in
ection 6.4 . 
.2. Results for ﬁrm location, different sectors and population 
We now turn to the effect of the RER on the number of
rms and employment across sectors. Compared to our baseline
esults ( Table 5 ), we use 1975 ﬁrm density as a control in the ﬁrst
wo columns, instead of employment density, to better take into
ccount initial municipality characteristics. Table 6 shows that the
ositive effect of the RER is also found for the number of ﬁrms,
ith a slightly smaller estimated effect than that for employment.
here are striking differences between domestic and foreign-
wned ﬁrms. First, the RER treatment effect is much larger for the
atter set of ﬁrms. The number of foreign-owned ﬁrms is 20.2%
igher in treated municipalities with a one-minute drop in travelime: public transport affects foreign ﬁrms more than domestic
rms. Second, access to the city center also appears to play a ma-
or role in the location decisions of foreign investors (the dummies
or distance to Paris exhibit a clear core-oriented pattern). The last
our columns show the effect of the RER on municipality by in-
ustry, broken down into Agriculture, Construction, Manufacturing
nd Services. The point estimate is positive in all industries except
or Agriculture, where it is not statistically different from zero and
f smaller size. These results then suggest that we cannot conclude
hat the RER caused a shift in industry composition in treated
unicipalities, except to the detriment of Agriculture, as expected.
Table 7 shows the results for population growth. We here use
975 population density as a control for the initial municipality
haracteristics. We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant but smaller effect of travel
ime on population. However, this is not robust to the use of
lternative treatment variables (see Tables 10 and 15 ) or to the
econd identiﬁcation strategy (see Table 16 in the Appendix). 
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Table 6 
The effect of the RER on ﬁrms and employment by industry. 
Dependent variable: ln ﬁrm 75 −90 ln employment 75 −90 
Sample: All ﬁrms Foreign Agricul- Manufac- Construc- Services 
ﬁrms ture turing tion 
Intercept −0 . 413 ∗
(0 . 228) 
0 . 795 
(0 . 663) 
−0 . 679 
(0 . 862) 
1 . 236 
(1 . 008) 
3 . 424 ∗∗∗
(0 . 997) 
2 . 249 
(1 . 496) 
˜ time Paris, 1975 −1990 0 . 046 ∗∗
(0 . 019) 
0 . 202 ∗∗
(0 . 077) 
0 . 016 
(0 . 097) 
0 . 127 ∗∗
(0 . 056) 
0 . 13 ∗∗∗
(0 . 041) 
0 . 084 ∗∗
(0 . 033) 
Time Paris , 1975 0 . 01 
∗∗
(0 . 004) 
−0 . 011 
(0 . 015) 
−0 . 0 0 06 
(0 . 0145) 
−0 . 014 
(0 . 011) 
−0 . 012 
(0 . 008) 
−0 . 008 
(0 . 006) 
5 km ≤d Paris < 10 km 0 . 17 
(0 . 106) 
1 . 086 ∗∗∗
(0 . 33) 
0 . 595 
(0 . 396) 
0 . 644 ∗∗
(0 . 266) 
0 . 02 
(0 . 234) 
0 . 079 
(0 . 12) 
10 km ≤d Paris < 15 km 0 . 106 
(0 . 094) 
0 . 843 ∗∗∗
(0 . 256) 
−0 . 218 
(0 . 317) 
0 . 405 ∗
(0 . 219) 
0 . 072 
(0 . 213) 
0 . 025 
(0 . 101) 
15 km ≤ d Paris < 20 km 0 . 051 
(0 . 093) 
0 . 483 
(0 . 305) 
−0 . 403 
(0 . 25) 
0 . 359 ∗
(0 . 196) 
0 . 012 
(0 . 176) 
0 . 024 
(0 . 121) 
20 km ≤d Paris < 25 km ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Share of farmland 1960 0 . 28 
∗
(0 . 155) 
0 . 116 
(0 . 674) 
0 . 849 
(0 . 521) 
0 . 296 
(0 . 372) 
0 . 014 
(0 . 251) 
0 . 184 
(0 . 174) 
Area 0 . 002 
(0 . 007) 
0 . 026 
(0 . 02) 
−0 . 012 
(0 . 022) 
0 . 008 
(0 . 012) 
0 . 012 
(0 . 013) 
0 . 008 
(0 . 009) 
Firm density 1975   
Job density 1975     
Ln dens. Agricult. 1975 −0 . 504 ∗∗∗
(0 . 099) 
Ln dens. Manufa. 1975 −0 . 278 ∗∗∗
(0 . 096) 
Ln dens. Constr. 1975 −0 . 564 ∗∗∗
(0 . 155) 
Ln dens. Services 1975 −0 . 256 
(0 . 19) 
Number of observations 96 74 69 95 96 96 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are run 
on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding the economic subcenters, and were located between 
5 and 25km from Paris. The treatment group includes only intermediate cities. The regressions on skill 
level are run on the labor force. The treatment variable ˜ time Paris , 1975 −1990 is deﬁned in equation (2) , 
page 8. 
Source: Population Census, SIRENE. 
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17 Note that we measure mobility for individuals who either live or work in our 
subsample of 96 municipalities that had a suburban train station in 1975 and are We also ﬁnd suggestive evidence of gentriﬁcation. We do
not observe either income or housing prices at the city level
in the 1970s or the 1980s. Given this data limitation, the skill
level of the population may be considered as an acceptable ﬁrst
approximation. We break down the population into three cat-
egories: low-skilled (primary- or middle-school), middle-skilled
(vocational- or high-school) and highly-skilled (higher education).
We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant impact of the RER on the highly-skilled
population, which is robust across speciﬁcations (see Tables 15 and
16 in the Appendix). This suggests a greater attraction of locations
that are close to RER stations: more accessible areas attract house-
holds with a greater willingness to pay for housing. Given that
the inner ring around Paris was already substantially urbanized
in the 1960s, especially in the vicinity of suburban train stations,
population growth would have produced a “densiﬁcation” of
treated municipalities. However, the literature has estimated only
a low supply elasticity on the French housing market, even in the
long run, suggesting that the RER is unlikely to have increased the
housing stock in previously-developed areas. 16 The small effects
on population combined with a greater share of skilled residents
suggests that better access produced a population displacement,
skewing the local population towards a higher skill / higher
income mix. As for the analysis in Section 6.1 on employment ef-
fects, we should note that we cannot cleanly separate growth from
intra-regional displacement effects, as we restrict our attention
to the Paris region and do not directly observe ﬂows from other
areas resulting from the RER treatment. 16 This question could be linked to the regulations regarding land use and building 
height in future research. 
A
m
R.3. Better access to the metropolitan job market 
We now turn to the effect of the RER on the length of commut-
ng trips to explore further ﬁrm location choice and transport. We
alculate by municipality the mean distance residents travel to go
o work and the mean distance traveled to commute from home
from census data). 17 We then regress this change in the distance
raveled between 1975 and 1990 on our control variables. Table 8
hows that in municipalities connected to the RER network, the
ean commuting distance of workers rose by 6.6%. On the con-
rary, we ﬁnd no impact of the RER on the commuting distance of
esidents. This is in line with the results in the previous sections,
howing that the RER more clearly affects ﬁrms and jobs than
esident location. 18 This also means that ﬁrms choose to locate
n treated municipalities as they can access a wider labor market.
he RER probably then produces job decentralization in the Paris
egion, as ﬁrms can hire workers that used to be accessible only
rom the central part of the metropolitan region before the RER.
etter public transport allows jobs to be proposed in peripheral
ocations that might have been too diﬃcult to access beforehand. located between 5 and 25 kms from central Paris: we call these two groups resi- 
dents and workers. Some people may work in one municipality but live in another. 
s such, the change in travel time for workers and residents is not necessarily sym- 
etric in these 96 municipalities. 
18 Columns (2) and (4) are intended as placebo tests, looking at the effect of the 
ER on commuting before treatment. 
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Table 7 
The effect of the RER on population by level of education. 
Dependent variable: ln population 75 −90 
Sample: All Primary Vocational Higher 
or middle or high education 
school school 
Intercept 0 . 243 
(0 . 167) 
−0 . 258 
(0 . 819) 
1 . 538 ∗∗
(0 . 756) 
2 . 239 ∗∗∗
(0 . 384) 
˜ time Paris, 1975 −1990 0 . 033 ∗∗
(0 . 013) 
0 . 039 ∗∗
(0 . 017) 
0 . 046 ∗∗
(0 . 019) 
0 . 068 ∗∗∗
(0 . 023) 
Time Paris , 1975 −0 . 005 
(0 . 003) 
−0 . 002 
(0 . 004) 
−0 . 009 ∗∗
(0 . 004) 
0 . 0 0 0 03 
(0 . 0035) 
5 km ≤d Paris < 10 km −0 . 149 ∗
(0 . 078) 
−0 . 236 ∗∗
(0 . 098) 
−0 . 342 ∗∗∗
(0 . 103) 
0 . 164 
(0 . 126) 
10 km ≤d Paris < 15 km −0 . 106 
(0 . 07) 
−0 . 182 ∗∗
(0 . 086) 
−0 . 272 ∗∗∗
(0 . 086) 
0 . 027 
(0 . 093) 
15 km ≤d Paris < 20 km −0 . 051 
(0 . 065) 
−0 . 07 
(0 . 075) 
−0 . 174 ∗∗
(0 . 078) 
−0 . 024 
(0 . 089) 
Share of farmland 1960 0 . 081 
(0 . 136) 
0 . 185 
(0 . 153) 
0 . 067 
(0 . 149) 
−0 . 184 
(0 . 144) 
Area −0 . 002 
(0 . 005) 
0 . 003 
(0 . 007) 
−0 . 0 0 07 
(0 . 0058) 
−0 . 007 
(0 . 007) 
Pop density 1975 < 10 0 0 0 . 183 
∗
(0 . 102) 
−0 . 022 
(0 . 284) 
−0 . 099 
(0 . 31) 
−0 . 224 
(0 . 17) 
Pop density 1975 [10 0 0, 250 0] 0 . 235 
∗∗∗
(0 . 087) 
0 . 108 
(0 . 182) 
0 . 091 
(0 . 194) 
0 . 092 
(0 . 152) 
Pop density 1975 [2500, 5000] 0 . 049 
(0 . 058) 
−0 . 038 
(0 . 123) 
−0 . 078 
(0 . 131) 
0 . 039 
(0 . 104) 
Pop density 1975 [50 0 0, 10 0 0 0] 0 . 001 
(0 . 0225) 
−0 . 024 
(0 . 063) 
−0 . 033 
(0 . 071) 
0 . 012 
(0 . 087) 
Pop density 1975 > 10 0 0 0 ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Ln dens. prim. or midddle school 1975 0 . 028 
(0 . 09) 
Ln dens. voc. or high school 1975 −0 . 091 
(0 . 103) 
Ln dens. higher education 1975 −0 . 284 ∗∗∗
(0 . 059) 
Number of observations 96 96 96 96 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions 
are run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding the economic subcenters and lo- 
cated between 5 and 25 km from Paris. The treatment group includes only intermediate cities. 
The treatment variable ˜ time Paris , 1975 −1990 is deﬁned in equation (2) , page 8. 
Source: Population Census. 
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k  .4. Distinguishing between growth and reorganization 
One important caveat should be noted regarding the inter-
retation of our results. The RER may affect both growth and
eorganization, in the terminology of Redding and Turner (2015) . If
mployment rises due to growth, there should be no employment
ffect in municipalities not directly treated by the RER. In this
ase, the RER network increases employment and the number of
rms in the Parisian region. On the contrary, if employment rises
n treated municipalities due to reorganization, this implies a fall
n other municipalities, potentially including municipalities in the
ontrol group. 
To distinguish between these two effects in ﬁrm location,
chmidheiny and Brülhart (2011) suggest using a nested logit to
eparate reorganization from growth. The estimation of this model
equires considering outside options for individual ﬁrms (for ex-
mple, the rest of France and other European countries). We leave
his more ambitious exercise for future research, since focusing on
ffects inside the Paris area (as required by the data at hand) does
ot allow us to separate the two effects satisfactorily. Despite these
imitations, we can carry out two simple empirical exercises to
rovide some preliminary evidence on the size of the two effects. 
The ﬁrst test is inspired by Redding and Turner (2015) . We split
he control group in two: the “untreated” part consists of areas
hat are close (between 0.5 and 2 km) to the treated municipalities,
hile the “residual” part includes more-distant areas (over 2 km
rom the nearest RER station). Relocation can be measured through
he comparison of the impacts on the residual and untreated mu-
icipalities. We here ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences in the controlp  roup (see columns (1) and (2) of Table 9 ), so that there is no
vidence of relocation from the control to the treatment group. 
The second test is inspired by Chandra and Thompson (20 0 0) .
nstead of comparing municipalities in the control and treatment
roups, we compare the neighbors of the treated and untreated
unicipalities. Some municipalities are not treated by the RER, but
re close (between 0.5 and 2 km) to a new RER station, some have
o RER station but are close to a suburban train station (that was
ot improved by the RER experiment). The results are presented
or employment and population in columns (3) and (4) of Table 9 .
e ﬁnd no signiﬁcant differences between the municipalities
ocated next to RER stations and those close to suburban train sta-
ions. This suggests that new jobs located in the municipalities di-
ectly connected to the RER network were not relocated from adja-
ent municipalities. If this were the case, the estimated coeﬃcient
n the variable “0.5 to 2 km from a RER station” would be negative.
These two tests lend little support to the possibility of job relo-
ation from other suburban municipalities. However reorganization
ould also result from employment decentralization from the cen-
er to the suburbs. As seen in Section 2 , there was massive employ-
ent decentralization during this period, and it is likely that the
ER expansion helped locate these jobs leaving central Paris. We
annot estimate this effect using our identiﬁcation strategy as we
o not know the counterfactual employment in the center in the
bsence of the RER. But we can make a ﬁrst guess at the size of
ecentralization by combining our results with those in Gonzalez-
avarro and Turner (2016) , who quantify the impact of subway
xtensions on urbanisation using lights at night data. We have to
eep in mind that this exercise is only approximate, as the two pa-
ers are not directly comparable. First, we look at the impact of the
12 T. Mayer, C. Trevien / Journal of Urban Economics 102 (2017) 1–21 
Table 8 
The effect of the RER on commuting distance. 
Sample: Workers Residents 
(dist. to home) (dist. to the workplace) 
Dependent variable: ln mean commuting distance 
1975–1990 1968–1975 1975–1990 1968–1975 
Intercept 0 . 928 ∗∗∗
(0 . 187) 
0 . 228 
(0 . 295) 
0 . 95 ∗∗∗
(0 . 093) 
0 . 885 ∗∗∗
(0 . 209) 
˜ time Paris, 1975 −1990 0 . 066 ∗∗∗
(0 . 024) 
−0 . 022 
(0 . 022) 
0 . 0 0 09 
(0 . 0042) 
−0 . 005 
(0 . 009) 
Time Paris , 1975 −0 . 003 
(0 . 003) 
0 . 013 ∗∗
(0 . 006) 
−0 . 002 ∗
(0 . 001) 
−0 . 0 0 0 07 
(0 . 0018) 
5 km ≤d Paris < 10 km 0 . 114 
(0 . 09) 
0 . 189 
(0 . 129) 
−0 . 155 ∗∗∗
(0 . 037) 
−0 . 278 ∗∗∗
(0 . 092) 
10 km ≤d Paris < 15 km 0 . 106 
(0 . 077) 
0 . 107 
(0 . 101) 
−0 . 094 ∗∗∗
(0 . 024) 
−0 . 178 ∗∗∗
(0 . 064) 
15 km ≤d Paris < 20 km 0 . 088 
(0 . 066) 
−0 . 06 
(0 . 12) 
−0 . 037 ∗
(0 . 02) 
−0 . 122 ∗∗
(0 . 053) 
20 km ≤ d Paris < 25 km ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Share of farmland 1960 −0 . 02 
(0 . 109) 
0 . 466 ∗∗
(0 . 188) 
−0 . 075 ∗∗
(0 . 031) 
−0 . 116 
(0 . 089) 
Area 0 . 016 ∗∗
(0 . 006) 
0 . 0 0 03 
(0 . 0085) 
−0 . 002 
(0 . 001) 
0 . 002 
(0 . 003) 
Job density 1975  
Job density 1968  
Population density 1975  
Population density 1968  
Ln dist. to home 1975 −0 . 406 ∗∗∗
(0 . 1) 
Ln dist. to home 1968 −0 . 443 ∗∗∗
(0 . 087) 
Ln dist. to the workplace 1975 −0 . 341 ∗∗∗
(0 . 034) 
Ln dist. to the workplace 1968 −0 . 315 ∗∗∗
(0 . 077) 
Number of observations 96 96 96 96 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All re- 
gressions are run on cities that had a train station in 1975, located between 5 and 25 km 
from Paris, and excluding the economic subcenters. The treatment group only includes in- 
termediate cities. The treatment variable ˜ time Paris , 1975 −1990 is deﬁned in equation (2) , page 
8. 
Source: Population Census. 
Table 9 
The displacement effect of the RER on neighboring municipalities . 
Dependent variable: log job log pop log job log pop 
Sample: 1975–1990 
Control group Neighboring municipalities 
(0.5 to 2 km from a station) 
Intercept −0 . 491 ∗∗∗
(0 . 17) 
−0 . 036 
(0 . 09) 
0 . 092 
(0 . 178) 
0 . 373 ∗∗∗
(0 . 13) 
0.5 to 2km from a RER station (1990) 0 . 104 
(0 . 08) 
0 . 007 
(0 . 037) 
0 . 071 
(0 . 121) 
−0 . 008 
(0 . 108) 
5 km ≤d Paris < 10 km 0 . 168 
(0 . 134) 
−0 . 072 
(0 . 074) 
−0 . 221 
(0 . 161) 
−0 . 252 ∗
(0 . 126) 
10 km ≤d Paris < 15 km 0 . 173 
(0 . 131) 
−0 . 041 
(0 . 086) 
−0 . 287 ∗
(0 . 163) 
−0 . 16 
(0 . 126) 
15 km ≤ d Paris < 20 km 0 . 006 
(0 . 128) 
−0 . 109 
(0 . 069) 
−0 . 129 
(0 . 161) 
−0 . 078 
(0 . 106) 
20 km ≤d Paris < 25 km ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Share of farmland 1960 0 . 386 
∗
(0 . 221) 
0 . 096 
(0 . 206) 
0 . 381 ∗
(0 . 208) 
0 . 221 
(0 . 223) 
Surface (sq. km) 0 . 025 ∗
(0 . 014) 
0 . 006 
(0 . 008) 
−0 . 028 
(0 . 028) 
0 . 003 
(0 . 018) 
Job density 1975   
Population density 1975   
Number of observations 64 64 54 54 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions 
are run on cities located between 5 and 25kms from Paris excluding the economic subcenters. The 
treatment variable ˜ time Paris , 1975 −1990 is deﬁned in equation (2) , page 8. 
Source: Population Census. 
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d  mprovement in the suburban-train system while Gonzalez-Navarro
nd Turner (2016) consider the effect of new stations. 19 Second, we
valuate the impact of transport on municipalities within the Paris
egion, while they estimate the relation between city gradient (the
elationship between distance to city centre and economic activity)
nd transportation in over 600 cities across the world. Keeping in
ind those caveats, we can carry out the following estimation. 
Gonzalez-Navarro and Turner (2016) ﬁnd that the elasticity
f the light gradient to the number of subway stations is 6%:
ities with larger subway systems have a ﬂatter gradient of ac-
ivity moving out from the center. As a ﬁrst step, we calculate
he change in the city gradient that would result from the RER
ith this elasticity. We make two strong assumptions in order
o make comparisons. We ﬁrst assume that the 4% drop in travel
ime due to the RER is equivalent to a 4% rise in the number of
ubway stations. The second (perhaps less strong) assumption is
hat the light at night elasticities also apply to jobs. Under those
ssumptions, the RER is predicted to ﬂatten the job gradient by
.24% in the Paris Region ( 0 . 06 × 0 . 04 = 0 . 0024 ). 
As a second step, we calculate the actual change in the city
radient in Paris, using our results and assuming that the RER
ffect only reﬂects job decentralization in the Paris Region. To do
o, we follow Gonzalez-Navarro and Turner (2016) to calculate
he job gradient in Paris: we calculate job density within a set of
ve “donuts” around the city centre. We calculate this gradient
nder two scenarios. The ﬁrst is the actual spatial distribution of
obs in the Paris Region in 1990. The second is the conterfactual
ituation (without the RER), considering that all job creation in
ER municipalities results from relocation from the central part of
he Paris region (Paris and some surrounding municipalities). The
stimated job gradient in 1990 is −1.577, meaning that job density
alls by 1.58% as the distance to the center of Paris rises by 1%.
he counterfactual job gradient is −1.594. Under the hypothesis of
ull displacement, we obtain that the RER causes the job-density
radient to fall by 1.7%, which is larger than the relocation effect
0.24%) from the estimates in Gonzalez-Navarro and Turner (2016) .
eeping in mind the strong assumptions made in our calculations,
hese results seem to indicate that reorganization via decentral-
zation occurs, but is not the sole determinant of employment
rowth in the vicinity of RER stations. 20 
.5. Robustness checks 
The central assumption of difference-in-differences models
s that the control and treatment groups would have evolved
imilarly in the absence of treatment. To test this common trend
ssumption, we carry out a placebo test and run the regressions on
he 1968–1975 period. The placebo test supports our identiﬁcation
trategy, as we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant impact of RER-induced travel
ime changes before 1975 using two different treatment variables
or both population and employment (see Table 11 in the Ap-19 In addition, for the Paris Region, Gonzalez-Navarro and Turner (2016) only take 
nto account the subway system and exclude the RER network. 
20 Overall, in our three (admittedly imperfect) tests of growth vs. reorganization, 
he second channel did not dominate. This result differs from some of the ex- 
nte evaluation approaches for prospective transport infrastructure. de Palma et al. 
2014) for instance use an urban simulation system to evaluate the “Grand Paris 
xpress” project (which is at least as ambitious in terms of the projected construc- 
ion of new subway lines as the RER at its time). This evaluation predicts a massive 
elocation of both employment and population from the periphery towards the cen- 
ral part of the Paris region, which is mainly targeted by this project. Ahlfeldt et al. 
2016) use a quantitative spatial model of Berlin, inspired by Ahlfeldt et al. (2015) , 
here they simulate the impact of the extension of a major metro line, with and 
ithout any increase in employment in Berlin (with and without growth effects, 
n the terminology used above). The results are closer to ours: there is a marked 
ifference between the two scenarios, pointing to a substantial role for the growth 
ffect, particularly with respect to the impact on city income and employment. 
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t  endix). The test also shows that the RER did not produce any sig-
iﬁcant anticipation effects on ﬁrms. We generalize these placebo
ests in Table 12 (in the Appendix) by estimating the effect of
ravel time on population and employment growth across different
ime periods (1968–1975, 1975–1990 and 1990–2006). The most
mportant ﬁnding is that the calculated changes in travel time only
ave “contemporaneous” effects. The improvement in travel time
etween 1975 and 1990 has no effect on either pre-1975 or post-
990 growth. A signiﬁcant effect here would have suggested that
he RER areas were selected as a function of their long-run larger
rowth prospects, casting doubt on any causal interpretation. 
Table 10 (in the Appendix) shows the results using alternative 
reatment variables: a dummy for the municipality being con-
ected to the RER network in 1990, the interaction terms of this
ummy with the travel-time drop, and the number of stations in
he municipality in 1990. These all yield signiﬁcant job-location
stimates, conﬁrming the robustness of the effect of public trans-
ort on employment. The latter is estimated to rise by 13.3% in
unicipalities connected to the RER network compared to those
hich only have suburban trains, and 12.9% with each additional
tation. As stated above, the travel-time drop only produces higher
mployment in the municipalities that are connected to the RER
etwork. This robustness check is inconclusive for population, with
he treatment effect being weakly signiﬁcant in only one out of
he three speciﬁcations and totally insigniﬁcant in the other two. 
Last, we estimated our model using the second identiﬁcation
trategy in Section 3.2 : the differences between the actual RER
etwork and the initial 1965 project. As explained previously, we
o not use the intermediate stations located on the RER lines link-
ng Paris to the economic subcenters as a treatment group here.
e instead use municipalities that were not going to be connected
o the RER in the 1965 SDAURP plan but ended up being treated
ue to the change in the initial plan. We obtain a very similar RER
ffect for employment and the placebo tests to our benchmark
see Table 14 in the Appendix). However, we do not ﬁnd any
igniﬁcant impact of lower travel times on population growth. 
. Conclusion 
The Parisian RER program enhanced the suburban train service
f one of the largest and densest urban centers in the world.
rom 1969 to 2004, it progressively improved public transport by
onnecting isolated lines, serving new economic sub-centers and
ncreasing train frequency. This experiment allows us to estimate
he impact of urban transit on population, ﬁrm and employment
rowth. A classic endogeneity issue arises from the fact that
ransport infrastructure are not randomly located. We address this
roblem by comparing different suburban train stations, which
ll existed before the RER introduction. Among them, some were
pgraded into RER stations and others were not, for reasons we
ocument to be, to a large extent, exogeneous to their future
rowth. First, one of the main goals of the RER program was to
onnect the city center to the new economic subcenters (airports,
he business district of La Défense and New Towns): we restrict our
nalysis to municipalities located along this connection, arguing
here was no intention to treat these municipalities. Secondly, the
iscrepancies between the 1960s projects and the 1990s network
onﬁrm there were no clear intention to connect some areas
ather than others except for economic subcenters. 
We ﬁnd that employment rose by 8.8% in connected munic-
palities over the 1975–1990 period. We also obtain signiﬁcant
nd positive effects for ﬁrm location, and especially foreign ﬁrms.
e ﬁnd no effect on population, but a signiﬁcant link between
he RER and the location choice of highly-skilled households, sug-
esting a gentriﬁcation effect of infrastructure. We run a placebo
est for both of our strategies, showing there were no signiﬁcant
14 T. Mayer, C. Trevien / Journal of Urban Economics 102 (2017) 1–21 
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pdifferences between the control and treatment groups before
or after the introduction of the RER. Our (rough) investigations
suggest that we cannot rule out a growth effect, in addition to the
relocation of jobs from the center of the Paris area to the suburbs
treated by the RER. A more rigorous treatment of this important
question requires additional data and probably a more structural
approach, which we leave for future research. 
Appendix A. The Paris region before the 1960s 
A1. Urban policy before the 1960s 
The history of suburban rail is intricate, and reﬂects the
changing place of Paris in national-planning policies and the
complicated relation between the city of Paris and its suburbs.
There is ﬁrst a strong and long-running opposition between the
city of Paris and its suburbs. The border, marked by a protection
wall in the 19th Century, and replaced by an urban highway in the
1960s and 1970s (the Boulevard Périphérique ), is still present in res-
idents’ minds. 21 The city of Paris was heavily renovated by Baron
Haussmann 22 in the 19th Century, and is still very much set out
according to the overall scheme established then. Conversely, the
development and organization of the suburbs was uncontrolled,
which did not prevent the population from growing rapidly there,
while it ﬁrst stabilized and then declined in the city center. 
The ﬁrst proposals to guide and organize urban growth were
presented in the 1930s 23 but were only partially introduced. The
post-WWII decade was marked by an attempt to “contain” growth
in the Paris region ( Cottour, 2008 ), especially in the 1960 PADOG 24 
urban plan, which attempted to restrict urban development to
the already built-up areas of the region. This central part was to
be reorganized and equipped, partly via transport infrastructure,
while the rest of the region was to remain undeveloped. At that
time, the capital city was regarded as crowded and overdeveloped,
and its size and growth were seen as detrimental to the balanced
development of the country. This sentiment was best summarized
by the expression “Paris and the French desert ”, referring to a
French book by the geographer Jean-FranÃ§ois Gravier that was21 Even today, the city of Paris is notably called intra muros . 
22 Prefect of the Seine Department between 1853 and 1870, which included Paris 
until 1967. 
23 The Plan Prost in 1932, for example. 
24 Plan d’Aménagement et D’Organisation Générale de la Région Parisienne. ery inﬂuential in the (central) authorities in charge of French
egional development. As noted in the text, the coming to power
f President De Gaulle marked the end of this Malthusian urban
olicy. 
2. Underinvestment in suburban rail up to the 1960s 
After a long period of underinvestment in suburban rail, the
ntroduction of the RER represented a rapid and unprecedented
mprovement in Parisian public transport. The French railways
ere mostly built during the 19th Century by private companies,
ith each company being responsible for connecting a particular
art of France to Paris. This institutional context produced a very
entralized network: the majority of lines go to Paris and circular
ines are much rarer than radial lines, especially in the Paris
egion. In addition, the networks of different companies were only
ittle connected to each other, and each had a different terminus in
aris, even after the merging of the private companies into a single
ublic company in 1938. It was consequently not possible to travel
cross Paris by train. A very dense and eﬃcient subway system
as constructed between 1900 and WWII, but this only served the
ity center. Contrary to some initial plans, 25 the subway was not
onnected to the existing railway lines that served the suburbs, as
he Paris city council decided against these connections in order to
imit urban sprawl ( Gerondeau, 2003 ). As a result, a commute from
ne suburb to another required a change of trains and a metro
rip (see Fig. 4 ). These initial decisions deprived the Paris region
f an eﬃcient suburban train system until the 1970s. There were
any proposals in the 1920s and the 1930s to connect isolated
ines by constructing railway tunnels through Paris and its suburbs
 Larroque et al., 2002 ). While the ﬁrst extensions of the subway to
he suburbs were actually built in the 1930s, there were almost no
mprovements in the suburban rail system. 26 After WWII, which
ad halted rail projects, a new suburban train system for Paris was
egularly mentioned, without actually being implemented. 
The ﬁrst substantial plan for suburban mass transit was the
960 PADOG plan. This summarized the previous propositions
nd suggested constructing a number of tunnels through Paris in
rder to connect isolated suburban railway lines. This was rapidly
ollowed by the start of engineering work for the East-West line
f the RER network in 1961. As noted in the text, the RER network
roject was actually launched by the SDAURP plan in 1965. 25 For example, the Haag project in 1887. 
26 Except for the electriﬁcation of the Sceaux line to the South of Paris. 
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Appendix B. Supplementary estimates Table 10 
The effect of the RER on employment - other treatment varia
(1) (2) 
Dependent variable: log employmen
Intercept −0 . 395 ∗∗∗
(0 . 145) 
−0 .
(0 . 3
RER 1990 (dummy var.) 0 . 133 
∗∗
(0 . 054) 
0 . 16
(0 . 0
time Paris 1975 −90 × (RER 1990 = 0 ) 0 . 02
(0 . 02
time Paris 1975 −90 × (RER 1990 = 1 ) 0 . 08
(0 . 0
Travel time to Paris in 1975 (minutes) −0 .
(0 . 0
No. RER stations 1990 
No. train stations 1990 
5 km ≤d Paris < 10 km 0 . 21 
(0 . 135) 
0 . 16
(0 . 14
10 km ≤d Paris < 15 km 0 . 152 
(0 . 102) 
0 . 09
(0 . 1
15 km ≤d Paris < 20 km 0 . 08 
(0 . 112) 
0 . 05
(0 . 10
20 km ≤ d Paris < 25 km ref. ref. 
Share of farmland 1960 0 . 176 
(0 . 166) 
0 . 22
(0 . 16
Surface (sq. km) 0 . 01 
(0 . 008) 
0 . 00
(0 . 00
Job density 1975   
Population density 1975 
Number of observations 96 96 
R 2 0.351 0.38
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels
that had a train station in 1975, excluding the economic sub
The treatment group includes only intermediate cities. 
Source: Population Census. 
Table 11 
The effect of the RER on employment - placebo tests. 
(1) 
Dependent variable: log employment 19
Intercept −0 . 61 ∗∗
(0 . 263) 
˜ time Paris, 1975 −1990 0 . 004 
(0 . 019) 
Time Paris , 1975 0 . 012 
∗∗
(0 . 005) 
RER 1990 (dummy var.) 
5 km ≤d Paris < 10 km 0 . 168 
(0 . 123) 
10 km ≤d Paris < 15 km −0 . 014 
(0 . 104) 
15 km ≤ d Paris < 20 km −0 . 014 
(0 . 1) 
20 km ≤d Paris < 25 km ref. 
Share of farmland 1960 0 . 388 
∗∗
(0 . 19) 
Area 0 . 008 
(0 . 009) 
Job density 1968  
Population density 1968 
Number of observations 96 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance lev
cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding the econ
from Paris. The treatment group includes only intermediat
deﬁned in equation (2) , page 8. 
Source: Population Census. bles. 
(3) (4) (5) (6) 
t 1975 −90 log population 1975 −90 
 249 
19) 
−0 . 355 ∗∗∗
(0 . 115) 
0 . 025 
(0 . 069) 
0 . 187 
(0 . 192) 
0 . 066 
(0 . 074) 
1 ∗
94) 
0 . 07 ∗
(0 . 038) 
0 . 054 
(0 . 087) 
9 
3) 
0 . 013 
(0 . 017) 
6 ∗∗
39) 
0 . 022 
(0 . 02) 
 006 
07) 
−0 . 004 
(0 . 004) 
0 . 129 ∗∗∗
(0 . 045) 
0 . 039 
(0 . 024) 
−0 . 069 
(0 . 05) 
−0 . 016 
(0 . 023) 
7 
2) 
0 . 249 ∗∗
(0 . 125) 
−0 . 091 
(0 . 066) 
−0 . 142 ∗
(0 . 083) 
−0 . 099 
(0 . 066) 
6 
1) 
0 . 118 
(0 . 094) 
−0 . 062 
(0 . 068) 
−0 . 098 
(0 . 072) 
−0 . 072 
(0 . 069) 
4 
8) 
0 . 068 
(0 . 108) 
−0 . 032 
(0 . 064) 
−0 . 049 
(0 . 067) 
−0 . 032 
(0 . 065) 
ref. ref. ref. ref. 
2 
5) 
0 . 111 
(0 . 167) 
0 . 062 
(0 . 139) 
0 . 066 
(0 . 139) 
0 . 057 
(0 . 141) 
9 
7) 
0 . 011 
(0 . 01) 
−0 . 003 
(0 . 005) 
−0 . 003 
(0 . 005) 
−0 . 003 
(0 . 006) 
 
   
96 96 96 96 
5 0.372 0.348 0.359 0.341 
: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are run on cities 
centers and located between 5 and 25km from Paris. 
(2) (3) (4) 
68 −75 log population 1968 −75 
−0 . 067 
(0 . 126) 
−0 . 262 
(0 . 249) 
0 . 142 
(0 . 104) 
0 . 027 
(0 . 019) 
0 . 008 ∗
(0 . 004) 
−0 . 0 0 02 
(0 . 0462) 
0 . 014 
(0 . 044) 
0 . 018 
(0 . 112) 
−0 . 1 
(0 . 123) 
−0 . 233 ∗∗
(0 . 1) 
−0 . 112 
(0 . 1) 
−0 . 142 
(0 . 106) 
−0 . 211 ∗∗
(0 . 095) 
−0 . 065 
(0 . 102) 
−0 . 108 
(0 . 103) 
−0 . 139 
(0 . 103) 
ref. ref. ref. 
0 . 307 
(0 . 185) 
−0 . 048 
(0 . 196) 
−0 . 111 
(0 . 2) 
0 . 008 
(0 . 01) 
0 . 008 
(0 . 008) 
0 . 008 
(0 . 009) 
 
  
96 96 96 
els: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are run on 
omic subcenters and located between 5 and 25km 
e cities. The treatment variable ˜ time Paris , 1975 −1990 is 
16 T. Mayer, C. Trevien / Journal of Urban Economics 102 (2017) 1–21 
Table 12 
The effect of the RER on employment and population over different time periods. 
log employment log population 
1968-75 1975-90 1990-99 1968-75 1975-90 1990-99 
time Paris, 1968 −1975 −0 . 151 
(0 . 228) 
−0 . 224 
(0 . 185) 
−0 . 239 
(0 . 158) 
−0 . 137 
(0 . 131) 
−0 . 19 ∗
(0 . 112) 
−0 . 056 
(0 . 079) 
time Paris, 1975 −1990 0 . 003 
(0 . 013) 
0 . 061 ∗∗∗
(0 . 02) 
0 . 007 
(0 . 012) 
0 . 019 
(0 . 013) 
0 . 023 ∗∗
(0 . 009) 
−0 . 002 
(0 . 005) 
time Paris, 1990 −2006 0 . 016 
(0 . 012) 
0 . 017 
(0 . 015) 
0 . 016 ∗∗
(0 . 008) 
0 . 01 
(0 . 015) 
0 . 012 
(0 . 009) 
0 . 013 ∗∗∗
(0 . 004) 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions 
are run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding the economic subcenters and located 
between 5 and 25km from Paris. The treatment group includes only intermediate cities. The control 
variables are the same as in the baseline regression in Table 5 . Each cell corresponds to a different 
regression. 
Source: Population Census. 
Table 13 
The effect of the RER on employment - weighted propensity-score matching. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: log employment log population 
1975-90 1968-75 1975-90 1968-75 
Intercept −0 . 176 
(0 . 276) 
−0 . 564 ∗∗
(0 . 251) 
0 . 211 
(0 . 173) 
−0 . 295 
(0 . 227) 
˜ time Paris, 1975 −1990 0 . 072 ∗∗
(0 . 028) 
−0 . 003 
(0 . 013) 
0 . 037 ∗∗∗
(0 . 012) 
0 . 021 
(0 . 017) 
Time Paris , 1975 −0 . 005 
(0 . 005) 
0 . 012 ∗∗
(0 . 005) 
−0 . 005 
(0 . 003) 
0 . 007 ∗
(0 . 004) 
5 km ≤d Paris < 10 km 0 . 2 
(0 . 147) 
0 . 101 
(0 . 124) 
−0 . 092 
(0 . 067) 
−0 . 032 
(0 . 105) 
10 km ≤d Paris < 15 km 0 . 13 
(0 . 133) 
−0 . 078 
(0 . 108) 
−0 . 061 
(0 . 056) 
−0 . 062 
(0 . 086) 
15 km ≤d Paris < 20 km 0 . 101 
(0 . 108) 
−0 . 024 
(0 . 079) 
0 . 009 
(0 . 054) 
0 . 048 
(0 . 1) 
20 km ≤d Paris < 25 km ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Share of farmland 1960 0 . 263 
(0 . 19) 
0 . 426 ∗∗
(0 . 164) 
0 . 209 
(0 . 143) 
0 . 017 
(0 . 18) 
Area 0 . 012 
(0 . 008) 
0 . 005 
(0 . 009) 
−0 . 006 
(0 . 006) 
0 . 001 
(0 . 008) 
Job density 1975  
Job density 1968  
Population density 1975  
Population density 1968  
Number of observations 96 96 96 96 
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are 
run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding the economic subcenters and located be- 
tween 5 and 25km from Paris. The treatment group includes only intermediate cities. The treatment 
variable ˜ time Paris , 1975 −1990 is deﬁned in equation (2) , page 8. 
Source: Population Census. 
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Table 14 
The effect of the RER on employment - identiﬁcation strategy based on the comparison to the 1965 
RER project. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable: log employment log population 
1975–90 1968–75 1975–90 1968–75 
Intercept −0 . 426 ∗
(0 . 249) 
−0 . 459 ∗
(0 . 243) 
0 . 162 
(0 . 161) 
−0 . 283 
(0 . 242) 
˜ time Paris, 1975 −1990 0 . 067 ∗∗
(0 . 031) 
0 . 031 
(0 . 029) 
0 . 01 
(0 . 023) 
0 . 031 
(0 . 028) 
Time Paris , 1975 −0 . 0 0 08 
(0 . 0053) 
0 . 01 ∗
(0 . 005) 
−0 . 005 
(0 . 003) 
0 . 009 ∗∗
(0 . 004) 
5 km ≤ d Paris < 10 km 0 . 329 ∗∗∗
(0 . 112) 
0 . 078 
(0 . 103) 
−0 . 059 
(0 . 076) 
−0 . 122 
(0 . 115) 
10 km ≤d Paris < 15 km 0 . 226 ∗∗
(0 . 102) 
−0 . 184 ∗∗
(0 . 082) 
−0 . 004 
(0 . 072) 
−0 . 179 ∗
(0 . 094) 
15 km ≤d Paris < 20 km 0 . 098 
(0 . 094) 
−0 . 093 
(0 . 091) 
−0 . 048 
(0 . 06) 
−0 . 165 ∗
(0 . 091) 
20 km ≤ d Paris < 25 km ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Share of farmland 1960 0 . 199 
(0 . 181) 
0 . 361 ∗
(0 . 186) 
−0 . 043 
(0 . 141) 
−0 . 063 
(0 . 219) 
Area 0 . 011 
(0 . 008) 
0 . 001 
(0 . 008) 
0 . 002 
(0 . 006) 
0 . 006 
(0 . 008) 
Job density 1975  
Job density 1968  
Population density 1975  
Population density 1968  
Number of observations 98 98 98 98 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions 
are run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding the economic subcenters and located 
between 5 and 25 km from Paris. The treatment group includes cities that were not connected to 
the RER network in the original 1965 plan. The treatment variable ˜ time Paris , 1975 −1990 is deﬁned in 
equation (2) , page 8. 
Source: Population Census. 
Table 15 
The effect of the RER on population by level of education – alternative treatment variable. 
Dependent variable: ln population 75 −90 
Sample: All Primary Vocational Higher 
or middle or high education 
school school 
Intercept 0 . 025 
(0 . 069) 
−0 . 347 
(0 . 758) 
1 . 292 ∗
(0 . 726) 
2 . 241 ∗∗∗
(0 . 35) 
RER 1990 (dummy var.) 0 . 07 
∗
(0 . 038) 
0 . 065 
(0 . 045) 
0 . 081 ∗
(0 . 046) 
0 . 133 ∗∗∗
(0 . 05) 
5 km ≤ d Paris < 10 km −0 . 091 
(0 . 066) 
−0 . 219 ∗∗∗
(0 . 076) 
−0 . 215 ∗∗
(0 . 084) 
0 . 125 
(0 . 114) 
10 km ≤d Paris < 15 km −0 . 062 
(0 . 068) 
−0 . 16 ∗∗
(0 . 076) 
−0 . 186 ∗∗
(0 . 079) 
0 . 025 
(0 . 092) 
15 km ≤d Paris < 20 km −0 . 032 
(0 . 064) 
−0 . 059 
(0 . 07) 
−0 . 134 ∗
(0 . 073) 
−0 . 027 
(0 . 093) 
Share of farmland 1960 0 . 062 
(0 . 139) 
0 . 154 
(0 . 153) 
0 . 044 
(0 . 153) 
−0 . 258 ∗
(0 . 139) 
Area −0 . 003 
(0 . 005) 
0 . 003 
(0 . 008) 
−0 . 001 
(0 . 006) 
−0 . 007 
(0 . 006) 
Pop density 1975 < 10 0 0 0 . 164 
∗
(0 . 098) 
−0 . 04 
(0 . 284) 
−0 . 225 
(0 . 291) 
−0 . 203 
(0 . 155) 
Pop density 1975 [10 0 0, 250 0] 0 . 223 
∗∗
(0 . 089) 
0 . 088 
(0 . 181) 
0 . 018 
(0 . 183) 
0 . 087 
(0 . 146) 
Pop density 1975 [2500, 5000] 0 . 019 
(0 . 056) 
−0 . 07 
(0 . 128) 
−0 . 153 
(0 . 123) 
0 . 0 0 06 
(0 . 0882) 
Pop density 1975 [50 0 0, 10 0 0 0] −0 . 022 
(0 . 023) 
−0 . 048 
(0 . 072) 
−0 . 075 
(0 . 067) 
−0 . 029 
(0 . 074) 
Pop density 1975 > 10 0 0 0 ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Ln dens. prim. or midddle school 1975 0 . 027 
(0 . 089) 
Ln dens. voc. or high school 1975 −0 . 116 
(0 . 096) 
Ln dens. higher education 1975 −0 . 277 ∗∗∗
(0 . 059) 
Number of observations 96 96 96 96 
R 2 0.348 0.291 0.389 0.562 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions 
are run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding the economic subcenters and located 
between 5 and 25km from Paris. The treatment group includes only intermediate cities. 
Source: Population Census. 
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Table 16 
The effect of the RER on population by level of education – alternative identiﬁcation strategy. 
Dependent variable: ln population 75 −90 
Sample: All Primary Vocational Higher 
or middle or high education 
school school 
Intercept 0 . 13 
(0 . 164) 
−0 . 425 
(0 . 874) 
1 . 688 ∗
(0 . 852) 
2 . 058 ∗∗∗
(0 . 37) 
˜ time Paris, 1975 −1990 0 . 008 
(0 . 023) 
−0 . 003 
(0 . 026) 
0 . 017 
(0 . 031) 
0 . 083 ∗∗∗
(0 . 028) 
Time Paris , 1975 −0 . 004 
(0 . 003) 
−0 . 002 
(0 . 004) 
−0 . 009 ∗∗
(0 . 004) 
0 . 0 0 03 
(0 . 0039) 
5 km ≤d Paris < 10 km −0 . 05 
(0 . 076) 
−0 . 116 
(0 . 099) 
−0 . 19 ∗
(0 . 11) 
0 . 209 ∗
(0 . 118) 
10 km ≤d Paris < 15 km 0 . 005 
(0 . 075) 
−0 . 069 
(0 . 095) 
−0 . 083 
(0 . 101) 
0 . 135 
(0 . 083) 
15 km ≤d Paris < 20 km −0 . 042 
(0 . 061) 
−0 . 033 
(0 . 076) 
−0 . 139 ∗
(0 . 079) 
−0 . 042 
(0 . 079) 
Share of farmland 1960 −0 . 041 
(0 . 143) 
0 . 058 
(0 . 17) 
−0 . 121 
(0 . 157) 
−0 . 212 
(0 . 145) 
Area 0 . 001 
(0 . 006) 
0 . 006 
(0 . 007) 
0 . 004 
(0 . 006) 
−0 . 002 
(0 . 006) 
Pop density 1975 < 10 0 0 0 . 333 
∗∗∗
(0 . 11) 
0 . 17 
(0 . 289) 
0 . 001 
(0 . 335) 
−0 . 126 
(0 . 183) 
Pop density 1975 [10 0 0, 250 0] 0 . 309 
∗∗∗
(0 . 078) 
0 . 208 
(0 . 175) 
0 . 145 
(0 . 207) 
0 . 111 
(0 . 14) 
Pop density 1975 [2500, 5000] 0 . 072 
(0 . 053) 
0 . 005 
(0 . 124) 
−0 . 086 
(0 . 143) 
−0 . 018 
(0 . 091) 
Pop density 1975 [50 0 0, 10 0 0 0] 0 . 01 
(0 . 025) 
0 . 017 
(0 . 064) 
−0 . 066 
(0 . 077) 
−0 . 066 
(0 . 076) 
Pop density 1975 > 10 0 0 0 ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Ln dens. prim. or midddle school 1975 0 . 033 
(0 . 093) 
Ln dens. voc. or high school 1975 −0 . 131 
(0 . 112) 
Ln dens. higher education 1975 −0 . 261 ∗∗∗
(0 . 059) 
Number of observations 98 98 98 98 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are 
run on cities that had a train station in 1975, excluding the economic subcenters and located be- 
tween 5 and 25km from Paris. The treatment group includes only intermediate cities. The treatment 
variable ˜ time Paris , 1975 −1990 is deﬁned in equation (2) , page 8. 
Source: Population Census. 
Table 17 
The effect of the RER and highways on employment at the municipality level. 
Dependent variable: ln employment 75 −90 
Sample: All industries Agricul- Manufac- Construc- Services 
ture turing tion 
Intercept −0 . 172 
(0 . 27) 
−0 . 188 
(0 . 279) 
−0 . 324 ∗∗
(0 . 126) 
−0 . 916 
(0 . 87) 
1 . 542 
(0 . 983) 
3 . 266 ∗∗∗
(0 . 994) 
2 . 331 
(1 . 514) 
˜ time Paris, 1975 −1990 0 . 086 ∗∗∗
(0 . 027) 
0 . 087 ∗∗∗
(0 . 028) 
0 . 032 
(0 . 098) 
0 . 115 ∗∗
(0 . 054) 
0 . 135 ∗∗∗
(0 . 043) 
0 . 08 ∗∗
(0 . 032) 
Time Paris , 1975 −0 . 006 
(0 . 005) 
−0 . 005 
(0 . 006) 
0 . 003 
(0 . 015) 
−0 . 018 
(0 . 012) 
−0 . 01 
(0 . 008) 
−0 . 009 
(0 . 006) 
< 1km highway (1990) 0 . 086 
(0 . 097) 
0 . 101 
(0 . 103) 
−0 . 328 
(0 . 242) 
0 . 4 ∗∗
(0 . 162) 
−0 . 19 
(0 . 161) 
0 . 098 
(0 . 128) 
< 1km highway (1975) 0 . 109 
(0 . 08) 
< 1km highway (1975-90) 0 . 023 
(0 . 244) 
5 km ≤d Paris < 10 km 0 . 157 
(0 . 133) 
0 . 154 
(0 . 137) 
0 . 149 
(0 . 124) 
0 . 811 ∗
(0 . 439) 
0 . 524 ∗∗
(0 . 216) 
0 . 086 
(0 . 225) 
0 . 049 
(0 . 136) 
10 km ≤d Paris < 15 km 0 . 088 
(0 . 102) 
0 . 092 
(0 . 106) 
0 . 14 
(0 . 096) 
−0 . 153 
(0 . 318) 
0 . 348 ∗
(0 . 195) 
0 . 103 
(0 . 214) 
0 . 012 
(0 . 103) 
15 km ≤d Paris < 20 km 0 . 05 
(0 . 106) 
0 . 05 
(0 . 106) 
0 . 085 
(0 . 11) 
−0 . 396 
(0 . 253) 
0 . 351 ∗
(0 . 195) 
0 . 022 
(0 . 177) 
0 . 021 
(0 . 122) 
20 km ≤d Paris < 25 km ref. ref. ref. ref. ref. 
Share of farmland 1960 0 . 245 
(0 . 157) 
0 . 26 ∗
(0 . 155) 
0 . 214 
(0 . 162) 
0 . 896 ∗
(0 . 501) 
0 . 22 
(0 . 377) 
0 . 06 
(0 . 248) 
0 . 161 
(0 . 17) 
Area 0 . 011 
(0 . 008) 
0 . 011 
(0 . 008) 
0 . 01 
(0 . 008) 
−0 . 009 
(0 . 023) 
0 . 004 
(0 . 012) 
0 . 014 
(0 . 013) 
0 . 007 
(0 . 009) 
Job density 1975       
Ln dens. Agricult. 1975 −0 . 504 ∗∗∗
(0 . 098) 
Ln dens. Manufa. 1975 −0 . 303 ∗∗∗
(0 . 095) 
Ln dens. Constr. 1975 −0 . 548 ∗∗∗
(0 . 158) 
Ln dens. Services 1975 −0 . 263 
(0 . 192) 
Number of observations 96 96 96 69 95 96 96 
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. Signiﬁcance levels: ∗∗∗ 1%, ∗∗ 5%, ∗ 10%. All regressions are run on cities 
that had a train station in 1975, excluding the economic subcenters and located between 5 and 25km from Paris. 
The treatment group includes only intermediate cities. The treatment variable ˜ time Paris , 1975 −1990 is deﬁned in 
equation (2) , page 8. 
Source: Population Census. 
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Appendix C. Maps Fig. 3. Control and treatment groups –
Sources: IAU – Îlealternative identiﬁcation strategy. 
-de-France. 
20 T. Mayer, C. Trevien / Journal of Urban Economics 102 (2017) 1–21 
Fig. 4. Example of the route between Le Bourget and Cité Universitaire with the RER. 
Notes: Before the commissioning of the RER, the journey between Cité Universitaire and Le Bourget required two changes of train. First, one needed to take a commuter train 
to the connection station Denfert-Rochereau , then metro line 4 to Gare du Nord , and ﬁnally another commuter rail line to the ﬁnal destination, Le Bourget . Thanks to the RER, 
it became possible to cross Paris from Cité Universitaire to Le Bourget without any connections, instead of the two previous connections, reducing the journey time from 45 
to 26 minutes. 
Sources: IAU – Île-de-France. 
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